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Chapter 5
Entitlement Reform and the
Future of Pensions
C. Eugene Steuerle, Benjamin H. Harris, and Pamela J. Perun

The United States retirement system is in a state of ﬂux. Large public health
programs, notably Medicare and Medicaid, have been a cornerstone of
American retirement, but unfortunately these programs are on an unsustainable path due to the aging of the population and prolonged growth in costs
for both the federal government and retirees themselves. Social Security’s
future solvency, while less of a budgetary challenge than the major health
programs, is also in doubt, with adjustments to either revenue or beneﬁts
required to bring the program into long-term balance. At the same time, the
decades-long transformation of the private, employer-based retirement system is nearly complete, with most private savers working to accumulate liquid
assets for retirement rather than credit towards a lifetime pension.
All three systems affecting the elderly—health, Social Security, and
employer-based retirement plans—have not been reformed substantially
in decades. Indeed, in our view, they have adapted too slowly to fundamental changes in the broader demographic and ﬁscal landscape. Close to onethird of all adults are scheduled to be on Social Security for one-third of
their adult lives, and only a modest percentage of households has private
assets at time of retirement near the value of their government health and
retirement beneﬁts. As a result, all of the growth in government spending
over the next two decades is slated to go for Social Security, Medicare,
Medicaid, and interest on the debt.
To be clear, we believe there are viable and feasible reform options, but
agreeing on them requires shifts in both policy priorities and federal law. To
this end, we offer a series of policy alternatives which could result in an
environment that would better protect the most vulnerable retirees and
minimize adverse effects on the middle class and the economy as a whole.

Budget Pressures and Entitlement Reform
The federal budget continues to be plagued by long-term pressures.
The combination of growing and unprecedented spending on major
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entitlement programs, porous income and corporate tax codes riddled with
tax subsidies, the absence of interest in any new major source of revenues
(such as an energy tax or a national value-added tax), rising expected
interest payments, the long, slow recovery from the Great Recession, and
limited ability to further cut non-entitlement spending all point to a situation that requires entitlement reform, as at least part of any long-term
solution.
One metric of budget pressures is the federal debt as a share of the gross
domestic product (GDP). Federal debt has risen from 28 percent of GDP in
1970 to 72 percent of GDP today, with a steep rise between 2007 and 2012,
when the tax base shrank and federal expenditures rose in an effort to
reverse the economic recession.1 Looking forward, the outlook is bleak
without a reversal in policy: the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) predicts that federal debt to GDP will steadily rise to 100 percent by 2038 (CBO
2013c).
Economists have been unable to identify a precise threshold at which the
debt-to-GDP ratio begins to cause severe economic harm, but evidence
suggests that the United States will not be able to maintain the level predicted by CBO without suffering some adverse economic consequences.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) note that nations can expect signiﬁcant economic harm once their debt-to-GDP ratios exceed 90 percent. Other work
suggests that Reinhart and Rogoff ’s calculations were mistaken (Herndon
et al. 2013), and that sluggish economic growth causes high debt, not the
other way around (Dube 2013). Nevertheless, while the exact empirical
relationship between growth and debt is not well established, several studies
have noted other adverse economic effects from debt such as higher interest
rates, interest costs even if rates remain steady, and reduced private saving
(Elmendorf and Mankiw 1999; Gale and Orszag 2004).
The squeeze on other government functions is among the reasons that
health and retirement programs are at the forefront of long-term deﬁcit
reduction focus. Major health programs and Social Security increasingly
dominate the federal budget and national spending, with their spending
as a share of GDP rising to 8 percent and 6 percent by 2038, respectively,
leaving little room for other initiatives such as transportation, education,
and infrastructure investment. Even defense spending, which received
a massive share of the federal budget for the ﬁrst decades after World
War II, is expected to comprise just 12 percent of federal spending in 2024.
Meanwhile, interest spending, perhaps the one ‘non-negotiable’ aspect of the
federal budget, is expected to skyrocket from 6 percent of federal spending in
2012 to 15 percent in 2024.
Recent legislation has modestly improved the short-run budget outlook
but achieved deﬁcit reduction largely through increased tax rates on upperincome taxpayers and steep cuts to discretionary spending. The Budget
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Control Act of 2011 (BCA) instituted $2.2 trillion in deﬁcit reduction
between 2012 and 2021, mostly by means of caps on discretionary spending
and automatic cuts in spending (mainly discretionary) through ‘sequestration.’2 A little over a year later, Congress passed the American Taxpayer
Relief Act (ATRA), which forestalled the bulk of a very large scheduled
increase in taxes during recovery from the recession by extending most
expiring tax cuts for all but the highest-income taxpayers, although it also
removed $620 billion from the deﬁcit when measured relative to ongoing
policy.3 The end result of these two bills was a modest improvement in the
short-run budget outlook achieved through higher taxes on upper-income
taxpayers and cuts in discretionary spending. The low-hanging fruit has now
been plucked, but the long-term pressures remain.
Asking the middle class for higher tax burdens or cuts in entitlements has
proved to be a tough sell by Congress to the American public; there seems to
be mixed public appetite, at best, for either strategy. On taxes, an American
Enterprise Institute 2010 survey conducted prior to the increased tax rates
on upper-income taxpayers found that Americans were split on whether it
was more important to reduce the deﬁcit (47 percent) or cut taxes (46
percent) (Bowman and Rugg 2012). A Washington Post survey from around
the same time was less ambiguous, reporting that 60 percent of Americans
supported higher taxes on households with more than $250,000 in income
as a deﬁcit-reduction strategy (Teixeira 2012).
Americans appear more uniﬁed in their distaste for cuts to Social Security
and Medicare. For example, one study found that only 13 percent of
Americans favored cutting Social Security as a way to reduce the federal
deﬁcit, and 72 percent strongly opposed Social Security cuts as a deﬁcitreduction strategy (AARP 2010); another study found that 75 percent of
Americans indicated that ‘we should consider increasing Social Security
beneﬁts’ (Tucker et al. 2013). Lastly, it is unclear whether the American
public is convinced that deﬁcit reduction is even a top priority, with 69
percent of respondents to a 2013 Pew Research poll answering that maintaining Social Security and Medicare beneﬁts trumped deﬁcit reduction as a
national priority (Pew Research Center 2013). Of course, for many of those
polled, cuts in Medicare and Social Security might affect them or their
family, whereas tax increases on higher-income taxpayers would be borne
by someone else.

The Inevitability of Entitlement Reform
In spite of polls indicating limited public support for any cost-bearing by the
middle class, solutions to the long-term ﬁscal imbalance will almost certainly
include reform to the entitlement programs from which they beneﬁt. Other
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solutions are generally insufﬁcient to ﬁx the problem in isolation. For
example, Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center researchers estimated that
in order to reduce annual ﬁscal deﬁcits to 2 percent of GDP through
upper-income tax increases alone would require raising the top two statutory tax rates to over 50 percent (Altshuler et al. 2010). Cuts to nonentitlement programs have already been a major part of short-term deﬁcit
reduction, with sequestration-led cuts and supposed lack of any new major
appropriation driving down discretionary spending to just 5 percent of GDP
by 2024. Lastly, while the growth in economy-wide health costs is an important contributor to the rising debt-to-GDP ratio, the debt is still projected to
rise to 112 percent of GDP if excess cost growth—the growth rate of percapita health spending in excess of GDP growth—falls to zero (Auerbach
et al. 2014). In short, while taxes, non-entitlement spending, and health
costs play an important role in projected deﬁcits, reaching long-term ﬁscal
balance is a nearly impossible goal without also addressing entitlement
spending.
Part of the challenge with cutting entitlement spending is that these
programs are tied closely to the aging of the population. The United States
is expected to undergo an unprecedented surge in old-age citizens over the
next four decades: by 2050 one-ﬁfth of Americans will be age 65 or older,
compared to just 12 percent in 1950 (CBO 2013c). In addition, the share of
Americans age 85 or older will rise to 4 percent by 2050—a ten-fold increase
since 1950 (CBO 2013b). Population aging is the largest factor in explaining
the growth in Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, accounting for over
half (54 percent) of the growth in these programs between 2013 and 2038
(CBO 2013c).
Indeed, the United States has already seen a pronounced increase in
health spending: inﬂation-adjusted health spending increased by nearly
400 percent between 1980 and 2011—from roughly $400 billion in 1980
(in $2011) to $2.7 trillion in 2011 (Council of Economic Advisors 2013).
Most of this increase can be attributed to factors other than aging of the
population and population growth. This rise in health spending, projected
to continue into the future, has translated into rapidly rising public health
expenditures. Excess cost growth accounts for 28 percent of the growth and
the expansion of Medicaid and the exchange subsidies—subsidies for lowand middle-income households who purchase health insurance through
health care exchanges—accounts for 19 percent of the growth. While recent
data have provided some cause for optimism, Steuerle (2013) shows that a
slow-down in cost growth in excess of the rate of growth of GDP does not
necessarily mean a slow-down in the percent of the growth in income being
absorbed by health care alone.4 For example, if health care grew to 30 percent
of GDP and then stabilized at that level, there would be no ‘excess cost
growth’ but health care would still absorb 30 percent of all income growth.
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We caution against the notion, however, that slowing the rate of entitlement spending growth is the only mechanism for achieving ﬁscal balance.
While we have little hope that discretionary spending cuts can meet their
currently scheduled target for decline, reform could also include adjustments to tax revenue, by either raising tax rates or limiting tax expenditures.5 CBO projections show federal revenues as a share of GDP at 18.4
percent, well below the levels experienced in the late 1990s and just a notch
above the average level from 1950 to today.

Structural Transformation of the Private
Retirement System and its Consequences
The private pension system, which is also a key pillar in the American
retirement system, similarly faces an uncertain future. In 2013, retirement
assets totaled $21.9 trillion—amounting to more than one-third of all household ﬁnancial assets (ICI 2013). That includes $2.9 trillion held in private
sector deﬁned beneﬁt (DB) plans, $5.6 trillion held in deﬁned contribution
(DC) plans, and $6.2 trillion held in Individual Retirement Accounts
(IRAs). In 2000, when total assets held for retirement equaled only $11.6
trillion, comparable ﬁgures were $2.0 trillion in DB plans, $2.9 trillion in DC
plans, and $2.6 trillion in IRAs.
This phenomenal growth in assets held in DC plans and IRAs (which
largely represent assets rolled over from DC plans) reﬂects a fundamental
shift in the private pension system. Beginning roughly in the mid-1980s,
private sector employers began terminating their DB plans. From a high
point of over 175,000 plans in 1983, only some 45,000 plans remained by
2011 (US Dept of Labor 2013). Over 80 percent of those plans were small
plans, covering fewer than 100 participants. Large plans with more than
1,000 participants, however, account for most private sector DB plan participants. The Pension Beneﬁt Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which insures
most but not all private sector DB plans, reported that in 2011 there were
over 33 million insured participants (representing 90 percent of all participants), but fewer than 40 percent of those were active workers in 2010. The
remaining 60 percent of workers had either retired or changed jobs. The
PBGC reported that the percentage of private sector wage and salary workers covered by insured DB plans fell from a high of over 30 percent in 1980
to a current low of 14 percent in 2010 (PBGC 2012).
Beginning in 1992, 401(k)-type plans became the engine driving the
growth in retirement plan assets. By 2011, the number of these plans more
than tripled to over 500,000, and the number of participants eligible to
contribute also tripled to 66 million workers (US Dept of Labor 2013).6
These plans are more attractive to employers than DB plans due to their
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limited long-term ﬁnancial commitment, reduced regulatory and ﬁduciary
burden, and lower costs of plan sponsorship. The net beneﬁts to employees
are less clear cut, with employees taking on signiﬁcant saving and near-total
investment responsibility in exchange for greater control over their accounts.
The 401(k)-type plan system is still maturing, although it is some 30 years
old. The ability of some participants, especially those who save consistently,
to accumulate signiﬁcant retirement savings indicates that the 401(k) system
has the potential to evolve into a robust second tier in the American
retirement system. To date, however, beneﬁts of 401(k) plans have accrued
primarily to older, longer-tenured, higher-paid employees at large companies. Recent policy changes to the DC model, such as offering automatic
enrollment, automatic escalation in contributions, less complex investment
menus, less expensive investment options, and more ﬁnancial education
may make the 401(k) plan a more efﬁcient engine of retirement savings
over time. Nevertheless, this will mainly help those employees who have a
plan at work, save, invest well, and do not withdraw early.
Critics of the current system point to its all too evident present inadequacies, notably its failure to provide all employees with a plan and failure to
generate for many employees adequate savings for retirement (Munnell
et al. 2012). They also point out that the current tax treatment of retirement
accounts, the second largest tax expenditure after health care, is expensive
and inequitable. (Tax expenditures operate like government spending for
designated purposes but through targeted tax breaks.) In 2013, the tax
expenditure for pension contributions and earnings was $137 billion, representing 0.9 percent of GDP. Moreover, 66 percent of the beneﬁts of this
exclusion accrued to the top 20 percent in income, while only 2 percent and
5 percent, respectively, accrue to those in the 10–20 percent and 20–40
percent income groups (CBO 2013a). The saver’s credit, in contrast, is
designed to assist low- and middle-income savers but it is small compared
to other incentives, costing just $1.2 billion in 2014 (Ofﬁce of Management
and Budget 2014).
Retirement assets represent a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial asset of most households. Retirement accounts represented 38 percent of assets, the single
largest ﬁnancial asset held by households in 2010, up from 29 percent in
2001. But only a slight majority of households owns such an asset, and the
share fell in the wake of the Great Recession. Between 2007 and 2010,
ownership of such accounts decreased, with steeper declines for middleincome, middle-aged households; by contrast, balances for upper-income
households increased (Bricker et al. 2012).
The dispersion in retirement account balances is reﬂected in the sources
of income for retirement-age Americans. Today, Social Security is the dominant income source for elderly Americans in the bottom half of the income
distribution. In 2013, for Americans 65 and older, Social Security payments
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comprised 85 percent of income for those in the bottom income quartile
and 83.5 percent of income for those in the second income quartile. Other
income sources were relatively insigniﬁcant. Those in the bottom income
quartile received 6.6 percent of income from SSI and public assistance,
while those in the second income quartile received 6.2 percent of income
from pensions (Poterba 2014). Income from earnings and assets were very
low for each of these income groups.
In sharp contrast, elderly Americans in the top half of the income distribution received substantial income from accumulated saving. The third
income quartile still depended on Social Security payments—making up
56.5 percent of income—but also received nearly 30 percent of income from
pension and asset income. Those in the top income quartile depended even
more on income from accumulated saving, with 35.6 percent of income
coming from pension and asset income (Poterba 2014). On average, those
in the top half of the income distribution depend on income from saving—
both within and outside of retirement accounts—for retirement security,
while those in the bottom half of the income distribution do not.

Trends in Labor Force Participation
When it comes to discussions of reform of either private or public retirement systems, there is a tendency among the mathematically trained—
economists, actuaries, and accountants, along with pension, ﬁnance, and
business professionals—to stress the ﬁnancial side of the issue. Yet many of
the problems that affect both systems relate largely to labor market trends.
Today, workers enjoy retirement for close to one-third of their adult lives,
Social Security beneﬁts are received on average 11 years longer than when
beneﬁts were ﬁrst paid in 1940, and private retirement assets must similarly
last much longer. Meanwhile, the combination of additional years in retirement and the decline in the birth rate means that close to one-third of adults
are expected to be on Social Security soon. A related concern is that the
employment rate among all adults has been declining recently (even independent of the Great Recession), and it is scheduled to continue to decline
with the aging of Baby Boomers.
Retiring so many people for so long is simply not viable, which is a
problem plaguing developed countries around the world. This labor market
issue is not going to be solved by ﬁnancial manipulations. To provide
income in retirement at the same relative level as before retirement, roughly
speaking, people would need to save around one-third of their incomes
each year. Alternatively, it would require a Social Security tax rate of about
33 percent if government were required by itself to provide that level of
income support.7
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On the positive side, labor force participation trends suggest that longer
work lives are becoming more common in the United States, so some
adjustment is already starting to occur. For most of the second half of the
twentieth century, the average age at retirement among men declined
substantially. In 1950, about 70 percent of men age 55 and older were in
the labor force, but only about 40 percent were still working by the mid1990s. Labor force participation by women exhibited very different patterns
during the same period as they expanded their presence in the labor force.
The participation rate of women age 24–54 essentially doubled between
1950 and 2000, while that of similarly aged men declined slightly. For both
older men and women, however, the mid-1990s began a period of pronounced uptick in labor force participation. Increases for men largely
occurred among men in their 60s, while women of all age groups increased
their labor force participation (National Academy of Sciences 2012).
Projections of labor force participation through 2050 anticipate that the
role of older workers will increase substantially, as the supply of young
(16–24 years) and prime age (25–54 years) declines. Older workers are
expected to offset some of this decline, and one projection shows their
labor force participation increasing from about 12 percent in 1990 to 24
percent around 2020 and then continuing to grow to more than 27 percent
by 2050 (National Academy of Sciences 2012). Steuerle and Quakenbush
(2012) have argued that this ﬁgure may be low, drawing on historical Social
Security projections that have consistently underestimated future labor
force participation among older workers. The projection error derives
from ignoring labor demand for older workers in the face of a reduced
opportunity for employers to hire younger workers.
Demand, however, can play an uneven role. Age discrimination in
employment is one key variable. The Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, enacted almost 50 years ago, is designed to protect workers over age 40
from workplace discrimination, but subsequent court decisions have made it
difﬁcult for plaintiffs to pursue litigation successfully. The United States
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission reports an increasing case
load of age discrimination claims, yet some two-thirds of claims are denied
at the agency level (EEOC 2013).
The jobless rate for workers age 55 and over reached record highs in the
Great Recession. Unemployment seems to be a larger issue here than
continuation of employment. Although the rate of unemployment for
older workers is below that of younger workers, older workers who became
unemployed spent more time looking for work. Almost half remained
jobless for 27 weeks or longer, compared to close to 30 percent of workers
age 16–24, and over 40 percent of workers between 25 and 54 (US Dept of
Labor 2010).
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One focus of research on the labor demand side has been on the service
industry, which comprises about one-third of the United States employment
base. Between 1980 and 2010, employment among workers age 65–74
increased by 40 percent, with 30 percentage points of that growth attributable to the service industry alone (Maestas et al. 2013). Speciﬁcally, a
1-percentage point gain in labor demand in the service industry in this age
group led to a 1 percent increase in staying on the job, about a 7 percent
increase in returning to the labor force, and a 3 percent decrease in
retirement. There is also evidence of a 4 percent increase in wages for
workers staying on the job and an 11 percent increase for those returning
to the labor force, along with reduction in claiming Social Security beneﬁts
of 14 percent at age 62, 7 percent at age 63, and 11 percent at age 64. In
other words, employer demand for older workers in an industry that offers
less physically demanding work, ﬂexible hours, and greater interaction with
people leads to increased work and longer labor force participation.
In terms of older workers’ labor supply, recent research indicates that
education and health status are key variables. While older workers at all
educational levels increased their labor force participation between 2000
and 2010, workers with at least a college education were much more likely to
continue to work. Less-educated workers responded less, perhaps because
their jobs lacked appeal, perhaps because of a higher Social Security
replacement rate, and perhaps because of a higher probability of chronic
health issues or more physically taxing work (Johnson 2013).
Psychological as well as economic factors seem to have been inﬂuential in
promoting longer work. Discussions about what is or should be the ‘full
retirement age’ in the media and in communications from the Social
Security Administration have raised the proﬁle of this issue. The public is
becoming increasingly aware of the advantages of working longer and
delaying receipt of Social Security beneﬁts for greater ﬁnancial security in
retirement (Butrica et al. 2006; Song and Manchester 2007; Steuerle and
Cushing-Daniels 2010).

Steps to a More Secure Retirement
Fortunately, the United States confronts its future in a relatively strong
position. The nation remains rich, with a GDP of more than $140,000 per
household, and government spending and tax subsidies (at all levels) of
$55,000 per household (Steuerle 2014). Those numbers are expected to
continue to grow over time, doubling perhaps in three or four decades, even
assuming a below-average rate of growth. To take better advantage of our
options, we can therefore exploit the additional resources made possible by
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economic growth, and the increased demand for older workers. Three
major types of policy changes deserve serious consideration. First, the
growth in public old-age beneﬁts over time can be targeted to the most
vulnerable elderly, particularly those in the bottom third or half of the
lifetime income distribution. Second, public pension reforms can encourage longer work lives and orientation of beneﬁts to the oldest ages. Third,
private pension reform can also recognize increased longevity and demand
for older workers while simultaneously making workplace saving more
automatic and accessible for workers, particularly at small- and mediumsized ﬁrms.

Increasing Social Security’s progressivity and limiting the
rate of beneﬁt growth for those with greater means
Social Security’s progressive rate schedule reveals that it is intended to
provide more to those in greater need. Yet some research has shown that
beneﬁts are not as progressive as one might think; indeed, excluding disability insurance, it is not clear that the system as a whole is progressive at all,
given that annuitization favors those in better health, and other regressive
factors, such as the design of spousal and survivor insurance (Steuerle et al.
2004; Brown et al. 2006; Steuerle et al. 2013). Nevertheless, it would be quite
easy to design a minimum beneﬁt or similar feature that could insure that
those with lower lifetime incomes, say, the bottom two quintiles, would
receive a higher level of lifetime and annual beneﬁts than they receive
now.8 This can be achieved in a Social Security system with beneﬁts either
larger or smaller than the ones currently scheduled. The key reform would
orient some of the future growth in Social Security beneﬁts towards those
with lower lifetime incomes.
Whatever beneﬁt cuts or tax increases are enacted to restore some longterm actuarial balance, almost inevitably they will be paid for by those with
the most means. Without recommending any particular proposal, it is worth
noting that such reductions in beneﬁts (or increases in taxes) have side
effects that need to be taken into account. For instance, if a slower rate of
beneﬁt growth were extended downward to those near the middle of the
income distribution, and minimum beneﬁt changes did not extend upward
to them, then private pension reform becomes even more imperative. Also,
if lifetime beneﬁt growth rates are slowed through annual beneﬁt cuts in all
ages (e.g. an increase in what is called the ‘normal retirement age’ in Social
Security), the incentives for work likely will be lower than such changes as an
increase in the early retirement age or the reallocation of lifetime beneﬁts
more toward later years. Put another way, that share of beneﬁt cuts in very
old age may do little for labor force participation.
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Encouraging longer work and shorter retirement
Employment patterns are signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by aging, but aging itself is
a bit of a misnomer, since it is composed of two very different forces. Living
longer does not by itself put additional pressure on government programs
or private retirement; typically it only does so if those additional years of life,
largely due to better health, are accompanied by an increase in years of
government-supported retirement and no corresponding increase in labor.
A decline in the birth rate, however, does mean an increase in the percentage of the population eventually moving into more dependent older years.
Its inﬂuence on current employment rates remained hidden until Baby
Boomers started attaining their 60s.
Government (and private pension) policy oriented toward need would
tackle the increase in the percentage of the population who will be in, say,
the last 10 years of life when ability to work decreases and health limitations
rise. That does not mean that such policy needs to keep extending beneﬁts
for more and more years as people live longer. Indeed, if old age is deﬁned
by something like being in the last 10 years of life on an expected basis, then
Social Security has moved over the years to being more and more a middleage retirement system, one that provides ever smaller shares of beneﬁts over
time to true old age.
Given trends outlined in this chapter, three changes in the design of
public retirement programs deserve strong consideration. First, the earliest
retirement age could increase, while years of support on average could be
capped at current levels or even decreased. It is possible to protect vulnerable populations with minimum beneﬁts and disability programs, without
providing so many years of support to middle- and upper-income and
healthy families. The perverse nature of today’s unreformed system
becomes apparent when upper-income people receive, for example, ﬁve
more years of additional Social Security support at $30,000 a year (or the
actuarial equivalent if they work longer) to provide ﬁve or fewer years of
additional support at $10,000 to those with low incomes.
To the extent these changes lead to higher labor output, the economic
beneﬁts extend far beyond Social Security: higher GDP, higher personal
income, and higher tax revenues. It is the one reform that allows for both
higher beneﬁts and lower tax rates, all other things being the same. For
example, an increase in the early retirement age generally increases Social
Security taxes and beneﬁts in tandem because of the actuarial adjustments,
but it simultaneously increases personal income, along with income and
Medicare taxes.
Yet another way to increase labor output is to backload beneﬁts in Social
Security, providing a lower up-front beneﬁt for most in exchange for higher
beneﬁts payable at older ages. For instance, a lower beneﬁt could be
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provided until average years of remaining life expectancy approach about
10, and then the beneﬁt could rise thereafter. This could be done without
reducing beneﬁts, on average, for those in lower income classes, through
higher minimum beneﬁts and similar adjustments already discussed. In
addition to beneﬁcial effects on personal income and non-Social Security
taxes, back loading also converts Social Security into a system that provides
most protection when needed, in the later years of life, not late middle age.
Signals from public beneﬁt plans also matter for private behavior, even
when there are few or no changes in net economic incentives. Here, we have
referred to the early 60s as late middle age, at least as measured by average
life expectancy. Evidence is mounting that Social Security communications
telling people they are ‘old’ and entitled to support at age 62, or that
‘normal’ retirement is at age 66 today, have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on
retirement decisions beyond any change in net economic incentives
(Steuerle and Cushing-Daniels 2010). Reﬁning those signals can have enormous inﬂuence on behavior, not just on near-retirees but on ﬁnancial
planners and employers who often follow those signals in designing, offering, and planning private retirement options.

Expanding the private pension system
Assuming, as is likely, that the 401(k)-type plan will continue to be the
dominant plan type for the foreseeable future, its expansion calls for three
elements: (1) access to a plan at work for more workers; (2) an improved
rate of contributions and return on investments; and (3) mechanisms to
secure income in retirement years. Few would argue with the merits of such
changes, but it is important to recognize that their success would entail
substantial revenue cost to the government. While such costs are unlikely in
the current environment of deﬁcit cutting, we believe they can easily be
accommodated in the broader context of Social Security reform because at
that point the government is already going to be reallocating trillions of
dollars of beneﬁts and taxes for very long periods of time. Traditionally,
Social Security reform tries to achieve balance for at least 75 years.
Access to a retirement plan at work has long been recognized as the single
most important element in improving the private pension system, yet many
workers, particularly those who need retirement savings the most, remain
outside the system. Legal reforms now offer employers tax credits for
sponsoring a plan, special plans with little or no discrimination tests like
the auto-enrollment safe harbor 401(k) plan, and reduced ﬁduciary liability
through participant investment discretion and the use of Qualiﬁed Default
Investment Alternatives as investment options. Yet there has been no appreciable increase in the percentage of employers, particularly small to mid-size
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employers, willing to offer plans. Small- and medium-size employer reluctance to do so is understandable because of the costs associated with complexity (partly due to all the choices available), dealings with accountants
and planners, and potential ﬁduciary responsibilities.
One clear obstacle to expanding pension coverage is the voluntary nature
of the United States pension system. Imposing a mandate on employers to
sponsor a plan, proposed on and off for the last 50 years or so, may not be a
realistic policy option in today’s political climate. Imposing a soft mandate in
the form of a ‘play or pay’ requirement in the spirit of the Affordable Care
Act’s employer mandate also seems politically infeasible. But it may be
feasible to attract small and mid-size employers to a simple plan that
expands participation by lower-paid workers. For example, in exchange
for a range of beneﬁts, the proposed ‘Super Simple’ 401(k) plan requires
participating employers to provide a minimum contribution and include all
employees through auto-enrollment at a moderate contribution rate. With
an additional saver’s credit contribution from the government, lower-paid
employees could receive total annual contributions of, say, 8 percent of
income, a healthy start to accumulating signiﬁcant assets. In exchange, the
Super Simple would have minimal rules, higher allowed levels of salary
deferral contributions, and little or no ﬁduciary liability for employers
(Perun and Steuerle 2008).
Creative possibilities also exist if we reconceptualize the role of the
employer as plan sponsor in the 401(k) plan system. In the old DB plan
system, it was necessary to have an employer-centric system where plan
sponsorship entailed signiﬁcant legal obligations to ensure that employers
made good on their pension promises. In a DC plan system where the
majority of the risks and responsibilities for saving fall on workers, where
independent ﬁnancial services companies provide investments, and where
professional administrators manage the plan, it is self-defeating to continue
to insist that employers as plan sponsors remain the ultimate guarantors of
the plan and all its functions.
There is increasing recognition that the next bold move in the evolution
of the 401(k) plan system could be to transform employers into facilitators
of their employees’ saving. This merely requires activating an employer’s
payroll system to transfer employee contributions to a saving plan run by an
external entity. Such a system has been in place for decades in the 403(b)
plan universe where employers typically make supplemental savings plans
available to their employees. In such plans, employers are not ﬁduciaries,
and their primary responsibility is to transfer elective contributions, limited
in amount as in the 401(k) world, to the plan chosen by the employee.
The MyRA plan, recently announced by the Obama administration,
represents a small step towards such a transformation of the role of the
employer in the for-proﬁt world. Granted, the MyRA account would not
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have all the bells and whistles of a full-ﬂedged saving plan, but it could
provide a badly needed ‘starter’ account for small savers. A more substantial
proposal which revitalizes the old payroll deduction IRA that has been in the
code for decades is the ‘Auto-IRA’ proposal endorsed by the Obama administration. Utilizing an auto-enrollment, payroll-deduction model, the AutoIRA would also release employers from the obligations of a plan sponsor or
ﬁduciary.
A related proposal for USA Retirement Funds would create a new retirement plan system for uncovered workers, in which the role of the employer
would be limited to enrolling workers and facilitating payroll deduction
contributions. USA Funds would be administered by a board of trustees
who would act as ﬁduciaries, and also engage professional money managers
and plan administrators. Finally, several states have decided to enter the
pension arena on behalf of private sector workers lacking a plan at work.
California has adopted the Secure Choice Retirement Savings Trust statute
to build such a system if research and design results indicate that implementation is feasible.
The chief drawback of most of these proposals is that they all lack
employer contributions, since under current law employers who contribute
to a plan become ﬁduciaries. Yet without employer contributions, it will be
difﬁcult for these plans to generate assets sufﬁcient for a secure retirement
through employee savings alone. Assuming that these new plans have robust
regulatory structures, changing pension law to accommodate employer
contributions without attaching imposing ﬁduciary duties could be
considered.
In summary, the private pension system has morphed from a DB to a DC
system without much thought or pre-planning. With so many proposals for
change to today’s system to make it more inclusive and productive, there is
now an opportunity for serious pension reform as well. A key consideration
should be a revised role for the employer in today’s employee-centric saving
system, focusing on facilitating employee savings supplemented by employer
contributions.

Conclusion
Long-term pressures on the broader economy almost inevitably affect considerations of retirement system reform, whether public or private. Today,
those pressures include a continuing decline in the adult employment rate
and the corresponding rise in demand for older employees as other sources
of labor become more scarce; public retirement and health entitlement
programs so out of balance that they are starting to crowd out education and
other spending; the tendency to provide more years of retirement support
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simply as people live longer; the growth in the percentage of the population
that is truly old because of a drop in birth rates; and private retirement plans
that are inadequate for most, along with the gradual evolution of deﬁned
contribution plans to employee-centric models.
We have noted ways that entitlement reform can accommodate those
forces while allowing private pension system reform to come along handin-hand and ﬁll other gaps in the future needs of households. Regardless of
particular approach, the ultimate measures of success include improved
ﬁnancial security for those retiring with near or below poverty incomes, an
increase in the percentage of the middle- and lower-income population with
signiﬁcant private ﬁnancial assets in retirement, and an enabling of greater
labor force participation to increase both individual incomes and government revenues to help achieve these goals.

Endnotes
1. The debt-to-GDP ratio doubled between the end of 2007 and the end of 2012,
rising from 36.3 percent in 2007 to 72.6 percent in 2012.
2. Kogan (2012) provides a discussion of the mechanics of BCA.
3. ATRA avoided steep increases in tax payments by permanently extending several
ongoing tax cuts that had been scheduled to expire, many of which had been
extended annually, sometimes retroactively. Major components include a permanent extension in the alternative minimum tax patch; extension of income tax
cuts originally enacted during the Bush administration for taxpayers with incomes
below $450,000 if married and $400,000 if single; and a 40 percent estate tax rate
coupled with a $5 million exemption indexed to inﬂation. See Harris et al. (2013)
for further details.
4. The growth in Medicare, Medicaid, and out-of-pocket medical spending declined
precipitously in the ﬁve years spanning 2006 to 2011 relative to the prior ﬁve years
(National Academy of Sciences 2012; Holahan and McMorrow 2013).
5. ‘Tax expenditures’ refer to deductions, credits, exclusions from income, and
special tax rates on other forms of income that reduce tax liabilities for some
households.
6. By 2012, the share of employers who sponsored a 401(k)-type plan had risen to 60
percent, up from 51 percent in 2009 (Copeland 2013). Overall, participation by
employees offering such a plan was 43 percent in 2012, up from roughly 35
percent in 2009.
7. Some calculations indicate that a lower level of income in retirement is feasible
because some costs, such as transportation, are lower, but these calculations
usually fail to include health care, where average costs under current practices
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rise dramatically in older age and either government or the individuals themselves
must cover those costs (Skinner 2007).
8. It turns out that many of those with limited lifetime incomes, particularly women,
have only a scattered work history, so such a minimum beneﬁt needs to be
designed both around low lifetime earnings subject to tax (the base for the
current rate formula), as well as some other accommodations such as some
minimum credit for some years of child rearing.
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